In different scenario’s it is required to configure some kind of routing protocol between two offices, but the routers should be configured to look directly connected to each other. Normally I always configure an IPsec VPN between the two offices and configure an additional GRE tunnel over the IPsec VPN tunnel. In that way the routers look directly connected and adding a routing protocol is no problem.
In the past I noticed several times that the GRE tunnel doesn’t come up, when using a Cisco PIX firewall or a Cisco ASA firewall. When using IOS 6.x on the PIX or 7.x on both hardware platforms, there is a workaround by using the following command:
clear local-host <remote peer>
Cisco has reported this bug in BugID CSCse36327:
The IPSEC tunnel was previously working and either one of the following events occured:
1. the crypto map and/or isakmp has been removed and reapplied to the interface
2. the PIX/ASA is upgraded from version 6.x to version 7.x
3. the PIX/ASA is rebooted
4. The remote IPSEC peer/s is rebooted
All events except 1 occur when a dynamic crypto map is used without a match address statement.
This typically affects only GRE traffic.
In PIX/ASA 7.x, GRE encryption may stop working (GRE packets are sent in clear) after removing and reapplying the encryption. This behaviour is by design in 7.x. If encryption is disabled but GRE packets are coming to the PIX in this time, GRE session is created on the PIX and marked as clear-text one (“do not encrypt”). When encryption is applied back, non-encrypted GRE session still exists on PIX and GRE packets that should be encrypted still bypass crypto map until old session is timed out or deleted. If there is a dynamic routing (OSPF/EIGRP/etc) running over GRE, this GRE session may never timeout and should be cleared manually.
In PIX/ASA 8.0.2, new functionality was introduced with new CLI command: “sysopt connection reclassify-vpn”. Default state is disabled. If this command is enabled, then enabling encryption causes non-encryption sessions to be dropped and reestablished with encryption.
Looks like there is a new command introduced in IOS 8.0.2 as mentioned above, by using sysopt connection reclassify-vpn.
There is also an entry on the Cisco SupportWiki about this problem. So the next time I will try this new command.
A friend of mine works for a well known auditing and penetration testing company in the Netherlands. Recently we were talking about how he starts looking for flaws in network infrastructures. My friend told me that the first thing he does is simply starting WireShark and start looking at all the packets he receives.
By default packets like DTP (Dynamic Trunking Protocol), CDP (Cisco Discovery Protocol) and HSRP (Hot Standby Routing Protocol) are broadcasted through all the different edge ports of a switch. Tools like Yersinia can be used by hackers to exploit these packets.
Normally when I configure a switch I always stop the broadcasting of DTP and CDP on normal edge ports, at least if possible. CDP is often used in conjunction with IP phones. I prevent broadcasting DTP and CDP with the following commands:
no cdp enable
To be honest, I never thought about the broadcasting of HSRP packets. I created a simple test environment with one Cisco Catalyst 3750G switch and configured VLAN 1 with HSRP, like shown below.
ip address 10.10.10.2 255.255.255.0
standby 1 ip 10.10.10.1
standby 1 priority 150
standby 1 preempt
This is the most default way of configuring HSRP. By using a tool like Yersinia, somebody could take over the role of active HSRP router by spoofing HSRP packets with a higher priority then the current active HSRP router. So I added a simple authentication text string to the configuration with the following command:
standby 1 authentication HSRP@ICT
This is no success, because when I start WireShark the authentication string is sent in clear text. The picture below shows an example:
In most recent software version you can protect HSRP by using MD5 Authentication. MD5 authentication provides greater security than plain text authentication. This feature allows each HSRP group member to use a secret key to generate a keyed MD5 hash of the packet that is part of the outgoing packet. A keyed hash of an incoming packet is generated and if the generated hash does not match the hash within the incoming packet, the packet is ignored.
To configure MD5 authentication in the previous example, I added the following configuration to interface VLAN 1:
standby 1 authentication md5 key-string hsrp@ictivity=secure,Ihope timeout 60
Now, when looking at the WireShark output, the key-string is composed of a hash and cannot be easily read by an hacker.
The timeout option is important when configuring a new key-string amongst all the members in an HSRP group. The timeout value is the period of time that the old key string will be accepted to allow configuration of all routers in a group with a new key.
So HSRP MD5 Authentication is another way of making our network components and network infrastructure more secure against “evil” attacks and hackers.