I replaced my Outlook 2007 with Outlook 2010. Since I am using Google Calendar, I would like to sync my calendar with Outlook. With Outlook 2007 you can use the Google Calendar Sync application. After installing Outlook 2010 the synchronization of the calendar didn’t function anymore. While synchronizing you will receive the following error message.
Outlook 2010 is available for some time now, so I don’t understand why Google didn’t release a version of Google Calender Sync which support Outlook 2010. I searched the internet and found the following article on the Google Forum. The article describes how the replace the GoogleCalendarSync.exe with a modified executable. The modified executable can be found here.
Just close the GoogleCalendarSync application and create a backup of the current executable. Replace the current executable with the modified version and restart GoogleCalendarSync. Now you are able to synchronize your Google calendar with Outlook. As far as I have read the thread on the Google forum, this solution should work for 32-bit versions of Outlook 2010. The status for 64-bit versions is unknown.
I have installed multiple reverse proxy servers based on Microsoft ISA 2006. These reverse proxy servers are mainly deployed to publish services like Outlook WebAccess, PDA synchronization, SharePoint or regular websites. Services like Outlook WebAccess are published using secure session protected by SSL certificates. Microsoft ISA server uses “Listeners” to match and intercept traffic from public users.
I have seen multiple ISA publishing rules with only match traffic when the user enters the specific URL in the browser. Let’s take OWA as an example. When users would like to access OWA, they need to enter the following URL: https://webmail.booches.nl/owa. The base URL is webmail.booches.nl and users need to add /owa manually, because internally the Exchange server is configured with a virtual directory called owa. Sometimes I see Listeners configured for HTTP and HTTPS and all HTTP traffic is redirected to HTTPS.
Is this solution user-friendly? What happens when the users makes a typo and enters http://webmail.booches.nl/ower? I try to configure the publishing rules to be user-friendly and I always configure separate Listeners for HTTP and HTTPS traffic. When publishing OWA I configure 3 firewall policy rules.
The first rule uses a Listener, which is configured for HTTP-only traffic and doesn’t use authentication. The firewall policy is intended for All Users and there is no authentication delegation.
|Action for HTTP and HTTPS redirect is to block the request and redirect the request to the correct URL for OWA|
|The Listener for HTTP is configured without Authentication method and the rule is intended for All Users|
|The public path contains /*|
The second rule uses a Listener for HTTPS-only traffic and uses HTML Forms Authentication with LDAP, RADIUS or another authentication method. The associated firewall policy is intended for all Authenticated Users and uses authentication delegation based on Basic Authentication or Negotiate (NTLM / Kerberos) authentication.
|The Listener for HTTPs is configured with FBA as authentication method and the rule is intended for Authenticated Users. The authentication delegation is configured for Basic Authentication or Negotiate|
|The public path configuration contains the appropriate Exchange virtual directories|
The third firewall policy uses the same Listener as the second rule, but doesn’t use authentication delegation and is intended for all users. The configuration of the path, users and authentication delegation is the same as the first rule.
When you need to publish additional services, like ActiveSync or Outlook Anywhere, you have to add the specific publishing rules between the second and the third rule, so the redirection doesn’t mess up your publishing.
This setup is very user-friendly, at least that’s my opinion. The public user only needs to type the base URL (webmail.booches.nl) correct and he is always redirected to the OWA sign-in page. Service like ActiveSync or Outlook Anywhere are automatically configured to use the correct public path (/Microsoft-Server-ActiveSync or /rpc).
One of our customers wants you use their locally installed Microsoft Outlook through a Citrix Access Gateway (CAG). Sales people from that customer travel through the country and use the Outlook offline to read or prepare e-mail to send later. These people use UMTS technology to connect their laptops to the Internet. The customers wants these sales people to have the ability to use their Outlook offline and actually send/receive mail when connected to a network with Internet access.
The customer is using CAG’s to publish multiple services to the Internet, so together with my colleague Edwin Houben from DigiPulse, we started to look at a suitable solution. The CAG is located behind a CheckPoint firewall and traffic to the internal network needs to go through an ISA server firewall.
First we started to look at the ports Microsoft Outlook uses to connect to the Exchange server. Looking at the settings from a laptop, the connection is made by FQDN of the Exchange server. While performing a netstat -na we noticed that Outlook uses two ports to connect to the Exchange server.
The Outlook clients connects to the Exchange server on FQDN. So the laptop needs to have an IP connection to the Exchange server. So we decided to use the Citrix Secure Access Client to give the user the ability to establish an secure IP connection to the network.
Looking at the customers network, we had to configure access-lists on two locations to make the solution more secure. The first location is a Network Resource in the CAG. The Network Resource enables only the above ports to the Exchange server IP address. The second location is allowing the IP address of the CAG to connect to the Exchange server on the above port numbers through the ISA server.
After configuring both access-list, we did some testing and the solution works perfectly. You can now use the laptop on the internal network and externally with the Citrix Secure Access Client without making any changes in the Outlook configuration.
Later, the customer noticed that he couldn’t use Microsoft Outlook anymore in conjunction with the Citrix Secure Access Client. After digging a bit deeper in the traffic flow between Microsoft Outlook and the Exchange server, I noticed that, beside TCP/135, random ports above 1024 are used. So I changed the Network Resource and the ISA servers to allow TCP/135 and the range TCP/1024-2000. I haven’t used the complete range of registered port numbers, so I hope Exchange doesn’t use a port above TCP/2000.
I didn’t some Googleing (or Googling or whatever) on TCP port 135 and I found some “funny” things:
Some well known Root kits also use this port to transmit data back to home base and download more malware. I also suspect may be an entry point for some root kit /malware for un patched systems or systems that did not patch correctly. Source
Currently inbound scans are likely the Nachi or MSBlast worms. Source
The problem with port TCP 135 is that it is used for multiple services, which are listed below. So blocking port TCP 135 could affect communication between devices or the usage of services.
|Client/Server Communication||DCOM||DHCP Manager|
|Exchange Administrator||Microsoft Message Queue Server||RPC User Manager|
|RPC Service Manager||RPC Port Mapper||SCM used by DCOM|
|SQL Session Mapper||WINS Manager|
Today I have be working on publishing Microsoft Exchange Outlook WebAccess and Active Sync to the Internet. We had some discussions with some Microsoft Consultants about a secure way to publish Outlook Web Access to the Internet, especially the authentication part of such a solution.
Some people are talking about publishing OWA directly to the Internet. In my opinion, this results in a major security thread, because you directly publish a TCP/80 and TCP/443 connection from the Exchange server to the Internet. An vulnerability or exploit in these services could end up in an hacker who takes over the Exchange server.
A second solution is placing a front-end server in a DMZ segment, but making the server a domain member for authentication. In my opinion still a security leak, because somebody who hacks the DMZ server has maybe the ability to hack or corrupt the Active Directory.
The third solution, and the solution we advise, is using a Microsoft ISA 2006 server as a front-end server in the DMZ. We configure a RADIUS or LDAPS (if you would like the option to change the password) connection to a RADIUS server or a domain member on the internal LAN segment. This ensures a secure way of authenticating users and even if somebody hacks the ISA server, he still hasn’t hacked a domain member server or a vulnerability in TCP/80 or TCP/443 of the Exchange server.
I have had a lot of help of an article on isaserver.org from Thomas Shinder while configuring the solution. I had some problems with publishing Active Sync. Ended up with enabling Basic Authentication on the Active Sync virtual directory (Microsoft-Server-ActiveSync).